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Introduction
Misery in another country is prosperity in Haiti. 2 Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 7. 3 John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1998 2 encouraging a shift from agriculture to manufacturing. This shift in production also drove Haiti to greater dependence on external markets for materiel and expertise. military junta under Lieutenant General Henri Namphy forced Baby Doc into exile, but the junta used equally brutal means to control the population. The junta did not establish a similar cult of personality. On September 11, 1988, Namphy's regime executed a large-scale crack down on unrest, killing 13 near the congregation of former catholic priest, Jean Bertrand Aristide. In the wake of further instability, Namphy installed an interim president, but popular discontent and large-scale unrest expanded, and Aristide helped found the Lavalas party (Creole for "we will wash away") to counter Namphy's policies. 6 In 1990, Haiti elected Aristide president. Aristide appealed to the populace because he seemed to have the interests of the people in mind and his Lavalas party advocated a socialist shift of wealth to the people. Aristide's socialist agenda faced opposition from the wealthy island elites. Aristide also suggested that he would crack down on the illicit drug traffic. This shift in policy toward the drug trade did not sit well with the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H), because the military profited from drug trade payoffs. Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Aristide's chosen chief of staff of the Haitian Army, overthrew Aristide in a coup on September 30, 1991. Cedras launched the coup largely because Aristide represented socialism and a shift in power from the 5 Ballard, [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] Ibid., 38-40. Haitian elite who had dominated Haiti for generations and because Cedras personally expected to lose income from a crackdown on the drug trade. 7 The shift to manufacturing during the Duvalier regime had effectively made Haiti dependent upon the US and enabled the US to impose an embargo against the Cedras Junta. The embargo failed to topple the Cedras regime, but increased Haiti's economic distress. In 1994, the Despite repeated interventions, and US and UN efforts in Haiti, the country remains unstable and faces continuing challenges to its development. Hence, the question: why have these past efforts failed to produce long-term stability? The answer to that question may inform future efforts to promote stability and provide humanitarian relief.
To determine why US and UN interventions failed to produce political stability and development, it was necessary to limit the focus of the research. Political development efforts are dependent on both the internal and external context. Thus, analyzing US policy in 1915 would require investigating a political and economic context that is both chronologically distant from current conditions and which no longer exists. Therefore, the research focus was limited to the period 1994 to 2010, from Operation Uphold Democracy to the Leogane earthquake, with the hope that the research would help improve US policy or doctrine. Evidence gathered on the results of US and international humanitarian assistance in the wake of the 2010 earthquake was 7 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) , 71-91. excluded because the policy focus differed greatly from the previous interventions and initial evidence suggests the assistance has been more effective. The results of Operation Unified Response in 2010 on Haitian long-term stability are difficult to assess because only two years have passed and more time will be necessary to evaluate long-term results. Thus, most of the evidence focuses on the impact of the U.S. military in Haiti during the period prior to the earthquake. Case studies of the two military interventions in Haiti during the selected period provided the framework for analysis.
To understand the United States military involvement in Haiti during the past 20 years and explain why this involvement has not produced long-term stability, the research outlined the strategic aims of the United States Government and the policy objectives associated with each commitment to military action. The 1995 National Security Strategy outlined the Clinton administration's policy toward developing nations, while the guidance given to JTF-180 throughout the planning process provided the strategic aims. UN Security Council Resolutions beginning with UNSCR 940 provided the record of guidance to the various UN missions to Haiti.
It was important to identify the policy objectives, because the military can be expected to direct most of its efforts toward defined goals.
Once the objectives were clear, the theoretical framework provided the means to evaluate the policy. Haitian growth and development stagnated, which in turn prevented its long-term stability.
The research evaluated the involvement of the United States military over time using the available doctrine to determine if the doctrine adequately supported the need and if the forces in Haiti adhered to the doctrine. The research determined that doctrine available at the time of each intervention provided inadequate guidance on actions to affect long-term stability in Haiti.
Although the military efforts during each intervention achieved their established objectives and those objectives adhered to the prevailing doctrine of the time, the limited aims of each intervention and the lack of resources allocated (in terms of troops, time, and equipment) directly contributed to a failure to achieve long-term stability in Haiti. The evidence leads to the conclusion that US military intervention in Haiti has not produced long-term stability due to limited aims, a focus on security forces, and doctrinal limitations.
Theory Development Theory
Development theory is a collection of theories that relate specifically to the social and economic improvement in nations. In Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions Jan Nederveen Pierterse defines development as "organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard of improvement." 9 While the aim of development theory is to describe these issues, it is often a vehicle for prescribing approaches to developing nations. Successfully using development as a means to advance foreign policy requires acknowledging that each society is inherently different and requires a unique approach. Foreign policy may find short-term success in one country under a particular development theory, but that success is not a universal concept that will bring similar results to every other country. As S.N.
Eisenstadt identifies in Building States and Nations, we must evaluate each case "in terms of its own history and traditions."
12 Nederveen Pieterse also notes that the cultural matters present in the individual society impact specifically on the development capacity of that society and that development theory is the means to describe the issues involved. 13 According to Talcott Parsons, "a set of "normative expectations" pertaining to man's relation to his environment delineates the ways in which adaptation should be developed and extended." 14 Those "normative expectations"
adjust within a society as fundamental change takes root, which is the goal of modernization.
Without a viable attempt to understand and interpret the individual values and beliefs of a society, however, it may prove difficult to shape the development process in a way that provides continuity and long-term stability.
Huntington also identifies the need for participation in governance and the need for strong institutions to secure stability, referring to the "degree of community in a complex With each administration, the United States revised its policy toward the Caribbean, but sought to influence development primarily through disconnected projects or military intervention.
The prevailing thought during the Cold War seemed to be that cultures and political systems would change dramatically strictly through capital investment or military intervention. Another prevalent idea has been the notion that forcing change in government will lead to sweeping economic growth. As Jean Grugel, currently a professor of International Development at Sheffield University, identifies, "international support for democratization, especially from the US, is part of a wider policy-orientation linking changes in the political system to economic reform and the creation of market based economies. 
Dependency Theory
Dependency theory grew from the backlash against modernization theory in the wake of several apparent failures in the 1950s and 1960s. These failures occurred despite heavy investment from developed nations. Investments with the intent of proving the superiority of the respective political philosophies managed to destabilize several economies. As the political science community sought to explain the struggles in Latin America, dependency theory began to emerge with the underlying goal of disproving modernization while explaining the dependency cycle that caused significant instability in the developing world.
According to Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, the economic trend in developing countries is toward growing disparities in income distribution and toward economic collapse. This trend is seen as a result of trade under unequal terms. The developing country depends on exporting raw materials to the developed countries for income and must import finished goods from those developed countries. 21 Dependency theory focuses primarily on negative outcomes from external involvement that serve only the interests of the developed nation. The disparity of income between the developed and developing nation set the conditions for the collapse of the developing nation. The economic disparity between the two nations tends to be even less significant than the destabilizing effect of this trade imbalance.
During the Duvalier regime, the shift from agriculture to textiles provided less wealth to the Haitian people, but more wealth to the Duvaliers at the expense of the people, primarily because the money made in the textile industry was easier to tax than the money made by subsistence farmers. This is reflected in the Haitian annual % GDP growth over the period. From 1965 From -1980 , when Haiti was still predominately agrarian, annual GDP growth was .9% in Haiti.
From 1980-1990, after the shift to textiles, annual GDP growth was -2.3%. From 1990-1991 GDP growth was -1.5%.
22
Although the US interest was not to create a dependent partner in Haiti, the result was the Haitian people relying further on the regime and a Haitian economy that could be manipulated through an external trade partnership. The shift to textiles financially tied the Haitian GDP to the international community, because Haiti needed to import the raw materials and the factory repair parts from other nations. The Haitian reliance on import materials for the textile industry made the use of a trade embargo in 1994 a cause of further economic destabilization. By the end of 1994, the GDP growth rate had declined to nearly -12%. 23 The embargo damaged the Haitian economy so significantly that it was only beginning to rebound at the time of the 2010 earthquake. US HOPE and HELP legislation enabled the US to become Haiti's largest trading partner, accounting for 66% of Haiti's total exports and 90% of Haiti's textile and apparel exports.
Textiles account for 68% of Haitian exports and 10% of total Haitian GDP. 24 Per capita, GDP remained consistently above $600 for the first time in Haitian history from [2007] [2008] [2009] . 25 The growth in the Haitian economy after the implementation of US trade preference legislation indicates that the import substitution that negatively impacted Haiti during the Duvalier administration and destroyed the Haitian economy during the 1994 trade embargo was a significant factor in growing Haitian economic security after the 2004 intervention.
Modernization Theory
Merriam-Webster defines modern as "of, relating to, or characteristic of the present or the immediate past." 26 If to modernize is to make something modern, then the idea behind modernization theory is to help a nation develop into a more industrial and connected nation that is capable of self-sustainment. Modernization theory is a form of development theory that describes the progressive improvement of nations, primarily through external economic influence.
Regional and international powers can greatly influence developing nations to modernize by providing material wealth, by introducing new technologies or techniques, and by investing in the developing nation's own industries and institutions.
Talcott Parsons, widely regarded as the first and most preeminent of modernization theorists, theorized that the "inner momentum" of modernity would allow it to overcome all previous cultural and political norms and predicted that all societies, given enough time, would become modern. particularly well suited for discussing stability operations. According to FM 3-07, stabilization is "the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development."
28 Modernization is the theory behind setting the conditions for successful long-term development.
David Apter, in The Politics of Modernization, classified societies by their structure and ideology. a society's structure and ideology determined their level and potential for modernization. Apter saw that highly structured societies with a traditional ideology made the best use of coercion, with members of the society carrying forth orders without question. These coercive governments manifest in authoritarian regimes that are successful in providing authority but lack external legitimacy. Societies with limited central governments and a secular ideology, produced a system that required greater access to information to accommodate the greater freedom of thought. Modernization expands the number of roles people fill in a polity. The need for information stems from the larger number of roles and increased individual awareness that compels the individual to seek higher education and social and political improvement.
Governments in these polities are more likely to evolve into successful representative democracies. Although the process would create demands on the government in the long-run, the government would become more stable and effective.
29
Modernization does not equate to democratization, however. Rather, as modernization succeeds, it brings about changes that make a shift to representative government more likely.
"Modernization brings rising educational levels, moving the work force into occupations that require independent thinking and making people more articulate and better equipped to intervene belligerents, only used force in self-defense, and easily maintained impartiality. 73 However, support to diplomacy equates more with stability operations, seeking to contribute to stability and the creation of conditions necessary for the peaceful resolution of disputes. 74 FM 100-23 gave no specific guidance and only vaguely described the forms of peace operations. The manual did not identify any associated tasks nor specify how to accomplish those tasks. This leads to the conclusion that the US military was doctrinally deficient prior to and during the 1994 intervention.
Perhaps the greatest military achievement for CJTF-180 was its successful application of As security responsibilities transitioned to the UN, the situation was already beginning to devolve into anarchy. Very few Haitians believed the approaching elections would fundamentally change Haiti. Democracy was not yet a Haitian concept. The Provisional Electoral Commission, comprised primarily of Aristide's Lavalas party members, set up a program to educate voters and set the conditions for a successful election under the supervision of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICVIH). 82 The Haitian people saw the Lavalas party as corrupt due to the way it rewarded party loyalty above merit. Not all of the candidates were on the ballot; some candidates were mislabeled; and the public sentiment reflected once again distrust for the government. When Haiti conducted legislative elections June 4, 1995, Aristide's Lavalas party won a significant majority. Large groups of Haitians protested. They burned several polling stations to the ground and burned their ballots in the streets rather than lend any credibility to an election process they saw as rigged. 83 Limited aims prior to the UNMIH mission had contributed to this failure by not addressing Haitian governance beyond restoring Aristide. CJTF 180 accomplished very little to foster legitimacy during the 6 months prior to the legislative elections because the mission assumed civilian agencies and the UNMIH would restore effective governance. CJTF 180's shortsighted aims were focused on civil security at the expense of stability. Limiting those aims meant UNMIH, an insufficiently resourced mission, would have greater responsibility for promoting stability.
Initial attempts at building police capacity in Haiti, one of the critical requirements for establishing security, failed to garner public support because the only experienced police were What the IPSF lacked in respect from the Haitian public, the newly founded Haitian National Police (HNP) Academy was supposed to overcome. IPSF members were barred from attending this academy, which kept the FAd'H out of the HNP and led to greater credibility with the Haitian population. The HNP, however, was completely inexperienced. They were described as "excessively polite, hence commanding insufficient respect, and too few in number."
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Ultimately, because the UN mandate called for the Haitians to be fully responsible for their own security by March 1996, this lightly armed, poorly trained, inexperienced force of 5,000 had to maintain the security of nearly 8 million people. 87 The limited aim of the UN mission in Haiti was to establish short-term security and fully transfer security responsibility to Haiti.
Theoretically making Haiti responsible for security contributes to stability in Haiti and 84 Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 137. 85 Ibid., [137] [138] [139] [140] Ibid., 142. Ballard, [216] [217] Brian S. Wesbury and Robert Stein, "Government Austerity: The Good, Bad and Ugly," Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/26/government-spending-taxes-opinions-columnists-brianwesbury-robert-stein.html (accessed January 16, 2012) . 90 Ballard, [98] [99] time, extending the mission termination date out to May 1997. With a day remaining on the UNSMIH mandate, UNSCR 1123 established UNTMIH, which departed in November 1997. The HNP demonstrated greater competence throughout 1998 in Port-au-Prince, but the situation was tenuous enough for the UN to extend the charter for MIPONUH by another year.
The great successes for the HNP were in the streets, where shootings went from 59 in 1996 to just 3 a few years later. However, the HNP failed to stem the tide of political violence and refused to disicipline its own members. 
Conclusions
Haiti has a long and complex history, marked by significant violence and repressive authoritarian regimes. Since the 1915 intervention in Haiti, United States Foreign Policy has been inconsistent and has sent a message varying from complicit support for authoritarianism in Haiti to lack of concern about Haiti's political instability and needs. Although the United States intervened in Haiti in 1994 and provided a temporarily stable and secure environment that successfully facilitated the restoration of Aristide as president, the United States did not commit to change in Haiti at the internal institutional level. This failure was due to the limited strategic aim of providing only a stable and secure environment. Because the US focus was almost exclusively on security forces, and because the US forces deployed without the doctrinal foundation to affect fundamental change no serious efforts were made toward building Haitian institutional capacity.
The various UN Missions in Haiti had a more direct mandate to promote stability and modernization, but failed to change the political and cultural inhibitors to long-term stability.
Successfully setting the conditions for long-term stability in Haiti would have required improving the political climate, developing economic security, and fostering openness to modernization. The majority of resources from the UN mandate concentrated on producing a short duration stable and secure environment and on establishing security forces. The long-term effects of occupation by the United States and the UN managed to have a destabilizing effect, as the personnel trained to provide Haitian security failed initially to gain the respect of the people, were inexperienced at handling the security challenge, and ultimately committed in human rights violations.
The only be a small part of a larger whole of government effort to produce long-term strategic ends in
Haiti.
